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T HE FIVE decades since the founding of the Journal of
Air Law and Commerce have witnessed enormous
growth and change in international commerce. In 1930,
the year the first issue of the Journal appeared,' the total
value of imports to and exports from the United States
amounted to $6.9 billion;2 however by 1980, U.S. interna-
tional trade had grown to approximately $460 billion.
On a global basis, the value of the world's exports in-
creased from approximately $28 billion in 19304 to more
than $2 trillion in 1982.5 Numerous factors explain this
great expansion in trade, but certainly one of the most
important was the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 6 adopted after World War II to establish a treaty
framework setting down basic rules for international trade
* Dean and Professor of Law, School of Law, Southern Methodist University;
J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Hamilton College. This article is based on a pa-
per presented to the Conference on International Law and the Future World Or-
der, organized by Southern Methodist University Law School, March 22-23, 1984.
Volume I, no. 1 of the Journal was issued in 1930. The Journal celebrates its
50th anniversary with the publication of volume 50 in 1985, rather than in 1980,
because it suspended publication between 1942 and 1947.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1940
487 (62nd ed.).
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984
831 (104th ed.).
4 Bidwell, Trade, Tariffs, The Depression, 10 Foreign Affairs 391 (1932).
5 United Nations, 1982 Statistical Yearbook 887 (32nd ed., 1983).
6 Protocol of Provisional Application, GATT, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A 2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
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and providing a mechanism for the progressive reduction
of trade barriers.
Trade statistics tell only part of the story of the evolu-
tion of international business over the last fifty years. Not
only has the magnitude of international commerce in-
creased, but its very nature has also undergone a funda-
mental change. Until World War II, international
business, except for extractive industries such as oil, was
confined basically to international trade and related pro-
duction. 7 After the War, however, foreign investment be-
came an increasingly important mode of international
business as Western firms, particularly from the United
States, established production facilities in foreign coun-
tries. Thus, whereas direct foreign investment 8 by U.S.
companies amounted to only $7.5 billion in 1929,9 it
reached approximately $226 billion by 1981.10 Moreover,
in 1981 alone, U.S. companies repatriated $32.4 billion in
profits from their foreign operations.I'
As part of this transformation of international com-
merce, a host of new organizations and institutions has
emerged to play new and varied roles in international
business activities. Foremost among them has been the
"multinational enterprise" 
- a corporation or group of
corporations with headquarters in one country and pro-
duction and marketing facilities in one or more other
countries and which, in varying degrees, pursues a trans-
national, rather than a purely national, strategy in con-
ducting its operations. Based primarily in the
industrialized countries,' 2 the multinational firm has be-
7 V. Salera, Multinational Business 7 (1969).
a Foreign investment may be divided into two basic categories: direct and port-
folio. A direct investment is one in which the investor has some control. The U.S.
government considers an ownership interest of 10% to be a direct investment.
Equity ownership of less than 10% is classified as a portfolio investment. Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1984, supra note 3, at 815.
V. Salera, supra note 7, at 19.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984, supra note 3, at 82 1.
Id. at 818.
12 Of the fifty largest multinational firms in the world, measured by annual reve-
nues at the end of 1976, 47 were based in the industrialized world; 21 in the
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come a primary agent of international commerce today
and is indispensable to the international transfer of capital
and technology.
In conducting its operations, the multinational firm has
developed a host of sophisticated international business
arrangements that hardly existed fifty years ago. Joint
ventures, technology transfer agreements, counter-
purchase contracts, Eurodollar loans, and transnational
management contracts have become basic instruments in
the conduct of contemporary international business. And
whereas the era of the 1930's viewed international com-
merce essentially as trade in goods and commodities, the
contemporary world considers capital, technology, serv-
ices and information to be equally important subjects of
international commercial activity. Moreover, unlike the
situation of fifty years ago, international business dealings
today are often based on long-term relationships among
parties in several different countries. Thus, no longer are
international transactions limited to individual, isolated
sales of commodities, such as sugar, across national
boundaries. They may also take the form of a joint ven-
ture between a multinational corporation and a host
country government to develop a sugar plantation and re-
finery which is financed by a Eurodollar loan concluded in
London and equity capital raised in Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait, constructed by an English contractor, equipped by a
French manufacturer, and advised by American consul-
tants, with its production to be distributed throughout the
world by a Japanese trading company.'
3
United States, 21 in Europe and 5 in Japan. Les 80 premieres multinationales mondi-
ales, in 1976, Cahiers Francais, March-April 1979, at 5. It is worth noting that
multinational firms based in certain developing contries, such as Brazil, India and
Korea, are also beginning to emerge. See generally K. Kumar & M. McLeod, Mul-
tinationals from Developing Countries (1981).
15 Certainly, the development of international aviation has both contributed to
and benefited from the growth of international business over the last five decades.
Although most exports are still transported by sea, international air cargo has
increased dramatically. Equally important, the rise of the multinational firm has
been supported by rapid means of communication, and the jet aircraft has con-
tributed immeasurably to its rise. Modern aviation has allowed new markets to be
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Another important factor in the transformation of inter-
national commerce has been the evolution of new centers
and structures of political and economic power. The in-
ternational community has undergone a profound "struc-
tural revolution"' 4 since World War II as a result of
decolonization and the emergence of nearly one hundred
new nations. The existence of these newly independent
states, often referred to as "developing nations" or the
"Third World", has created important new business
opportunities, as well as a multitude of legislative and
political systems with which to deal. And whereas interna-
tional business was controlled essentially by Western na-
tions in 1945, today non-Western countries such asJapan,
Singapore, and the Arab oil-producing states exert a ma-
jor influence on the ebb and flow of international com-
mercial activity.
This rapid survey of international commerce over the
last fifty years reveals that it has been transformed by
three new and powerful factors: the growth of direct for-
eign investment as a mode of doing business, the develop-
ment of the multinational firm, and the emergence of
developing countries. The relationship among the three
factors remains problematic in the international commer-
cial system. Whereas the international community has de-
veloped basic rules governing trade, it has yet to
formulate an international legal framework to accommo-
date these factors, particularly with regard to direct for-
eign investment by multinational enterprises in
developing countries.' 5 As one contemplates the next
opened, international business opportunities to be developed, transnational
agreements to be made, and far-flung operations to be managed effectively.
,4 Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 4 (1978).
is In 1970, the International Court of Justice, in the famous case of the Barce-
lona Traction Company (Belgium v. Spain) acknowledged the lack of international
law in this area:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century,
the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the interna-
tional activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies,
which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the
economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight
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fifty years in international business, it would appear that
the creation of such a legal framework will be one of the
international community's principal challenges. The pur-
pose of this article is to explore the possibilities of meet-
ing this challenge.
II. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
AN AMBIVALENT RELATIONSHIP
Despite the growth and expansion of international busi-
ness over the last fifty years, great disparities in economic
well-being prevail throughout the World. In particular,
the developing nations - two-thirds of the earth's popu-
lation - remain far from the levels of economic advance-
ment enjoyed by the industrialized nations. This fact
takes on greater significance when one realizes that the
Third World will account for four-fifth's of this planet's
population by the year 2000. The economic advancement
of the less developed countries is vital to global prosperity
and peace. Not only is an improvement in the well-being
of their impoverished and rapidly growing populations an
essential ingredient for international stability, but their
large potential markets and productive capacities are also
increasingly important to the economic growth of the in-
dustrialized countries.
The realization of economic development in the Third
World will almost certainly require massive transfers of
capital and technology from the industrialized West, since
pure self-reliance does not appear to be a workable devel-
opmental strategy for most developing countries. At
present, however, available sources of development fi-
nance are insufficient and may, indeed, be diminishing.
Although the petrodollar surpluses of the 1970's prom-
ised significant financial resources for this purpose, both
through international commercial banks which "recycled"
appear surprising that the evolution of law has not gone further and
that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on
the international plane. 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 46-47.
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a portion of the surplus to developing countries by means
of the Eurodollar market,' 6 and through OPEC financial
institutions which provided funds directly,' 7 the situation
of the Third World is much less optimistic today. As a
result of their great borrowing activity in the last decade,
the developing countries are now laboring under a bur-
den of debt estimated to be $600 billion.' 8 International
commercial banks have understandably become extremely
cautious in extending new credit, and an increase in bank
lending to the developing countries is definitely not to be
expected for the foreseeable future. Moreover, with the
decline in oil revenues as a result of the fall in the price of
petroleum, the governments and financial institutions of
the OPEC countries have also become less able and less
willing to serve as sources of development finance.' 9 Fi-
nally, official development assistance from the West has
remained relatively stable and shows no indication of in-
creasing dramatically to the magnitude required to meet
the financial needs of the developing nations.20
In these financially stringent circumstances, direct for-
eign investment from the West - primarily from private
sources and particularly through the intermediary of mul-
tinational corporations - may become an increasingly im-
portant source of capital and technology for developing
countries. Thus far, however, the developing countries
have enjoyed only a small share - probably less than
thirty percent - of all direct foreign investment. 2' The
16 Silkenat, Eurodollar Borrowings by Developing States: Terms and Negotiating
Problems, 20 Harv. Int'l LJ. 89 (1979).
17 Salacuse, Arab Capital and Middle Eastern Development Finance: The Emerging In-
stitutional Framework 14 J. World Trade L. 283 (1980).
18 20 U.S. Export Weekly 590 (1984).
19 OPEC aid to developing countries reached a peak of $9.7 billion in 1980 and
then declined to $8.5 billion in 1981 and $6.8 billion in 1982. OECD, Develop-
ment Cooperation: 1983 Review 87 (1983).
20 Total official development assistance from OECD countries to developing
countries reached an all-time high in 1980 with $37.33 billion. It then declined in
1981 to $36.63 billion and declined still further in 1982 to $34.24 billion. OECD,
Development Cooperation: 1983 Review 51 (1983).
2 Shihata, Increasing Private Capital Flows to LDCs, 21 Finance & Development,
December 1984, at 6. Similarly, out of the total United States direct investment
[50
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mobilization of this form of finance has faced significant
problems, including inadequate infrastructure, political
instability, and the small markets of many host nations. A
further obstacle resides in the laws, regulations and prac-
tices which host governments have adopted to control the
entry and operation of direct foreign investment in their
territories. Suspicious of the impact of foreign investment
and multinational firms on their societies and economies,
developing countries have established these controls in
order to protect various important national interests.
Capital-exporting countries and their multinational en-
terprises have quite naturally viewed such controls not as
"protections," but as "barriers to investment" that are con-
trary to their own particular interests. Clearly, if the bar-
riers to direct foreign investment are to be lowered so as
to increase the flow of capital and technology to the Third
World, an accommodation of these various national inter-
ests will have to take place. Generally speaking, such ac-
commodation of interests can only occur within the
framework of international law.
To accommodate the interests of developing host coun-
tries, one must first understand them. The Third World
consists of a diverse group of countries whose policies to-
ward foreign investment cover a broad spectrum, from ac-
tive encouragement to strict prohibition. Their laws and
regulatory systems clearly reflect a multiplicity of ap-
proaches to this problem. Nonetheless, despite this diver-
sity, few, if any, host countries consider foreign
investment, in and of itself, as a good thing. Rather, they
tend to view a foreign investment project as desirable if it
abroad of $227 billion by the end of 1981, only about 30% was in developing
countries. 18 U.S. Export Weekly 17 (1982). Multinational corporations have by
no means distributed their direct investment evenly throughout the developing
world, but have tended to concentrate their investments in those developing
countries having relatively high levels of per capita income. For example, at the
end of 1977, nearly 57% of developing country investment by multinationals was
in 34 countries with a per capita income of over $1000. United Nations Economic
and Social Council, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Progress To-
ward the Establishment of the Non International Economic Order 13, May 16,
1980.
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has desirable effects for the host country and its economy.
Even the most liberal governments will usually acknowl-
edge that foreign investment has both potential costs and
potential benefits for the host country. The benefits to be
derived from an investment project will depend upon its
nature, as well as the country's own particular situation,
and such benefits may include increased foreign exchange
through export earnings, increased employment opportu-
nities for nationals, transfer of new technologies and
skills, links to world markets, development of local re-
sources, strengthening of existing industries, and an in-
creased tax base.
At the same time, virtually all host governments also ac-
knowledge that foreign investment, particularly that un-
dertaken by a large multinational firm, may entail severe
costs, including real or apparent foreign domination of
the economy, potential interference in domestic political
affairs, stultification of domestic nascent industries and
businesses through destructive competition, 22 the intro-
duction of inappropriate or harmful technology, 23 loss of
foreign exchange reserves,24 and the encouragement of
undesirable patterns of consumption and behavior in the
local population. 5 Developing country governments
point to numerous examples of the negative effects of a
foreign investment project on a developing country and
22 Most developing country governments have considerably less faith in the
benefits of competition than tends to prevail in the United States. They are par-
ticularly concerned about the fairness of competition which pits their infant indus-
tries against powerful multinational corporations. They fear that the result will be
the destruction of domestic industry.
2. For example, the introduction of advanced capital-intensive technology may
actually reduce, rather than create, employment opportunities for local residents.
The use of certain mining and forestry techniques, while highly efficient, may re-
sult in lasting injury to the local environment.
24 A foreign investment project, which serves only the local market, may result
in a drain on the host country's foreign exchange through repatriation of profits,
payment of foreign royalties and management fees, the purchase of foreign mater-
ials, components and spare parts, and ultimately the repatriation of capital itself.
2s The introduction of large-scale foreign investment may result in increased
demand for luxury consumer goods by the local population. Local traditions and
values may also be eroded, for example, by a large touristic project's impact on
the country's youth.
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its people. The recent tragic death of over 2,000 persons
in Bhopal, India, as a result of a poisonous gas leak from a
Union Carbide chemical plant is an extreme case which
has attracted world-wide attention. Underlying these con-
cerns is the realization that the moving force behind a for-
eign investment project is a multinational corporation
over which host country governments may have little ef-
fective control.
Most developing country governments view the mul-
tinational enterprise with much ambivalence. On the one
hand, as great sources of capital and technology, multina-
tional corporations are important, if not indispensible, to
many nations in attaining their economic goals. On the
other hand, by virtue of their large concentrations of
power and their transnational structure and scope of ac-
tivities, multinational corporations are difficult, if not im-
possible, for national governments to regulate effectively.
As Raymond Vernon argued so cogently almost fifteen
years ago, their structure and method of operation permit
them to escape the full brunt of host country jurisdiction
and to hold "sovereignty at bay." 2 6
One of the most significant manifestations of their abil-
ity to avoid the regulation of a given country is the ease
with which they may restructure their operations, either in
response to adverse economic factors or negative regula-
tory environment. Thus, Vernon stressed the "basic
asymmetry" between multinational enterprises and na-
tional governments, arising from the fact that while the
power of a national government is limited to fixed terri-
tory, the multinational corporation with affiliates through
out the world can easily shift activities and resources from
one location to another.27 Faced with adverse changes in
the tax laws, labor laws, environmental controls, or for-
eign exchange regulations of a particular host govern-
ment, the multinational enterprise may not simply accept
2(i R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (1971).
27 Id. at 265. See also Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After, 35 Int'l Org.
517 (1981).
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the new measures and continue on as best it can. Rather,
its response may be to remove all or part of its operations
outside of the legislative jurisdiction of the country
concerned.28
A further reason for concern by developing country
governments is the uncertainty over the extent to which
the multinational corporation will be held responsible for
the acts of its subsidiary in the host country. Investment
projects in developing countries rarely take the form of
branches of the existing U.S. parent, but rather of legally
separate entities incorporated in the host country, or in
some cases, in a third country. Although the multina-
tional corporation may be viewed economically as a unit
of global dimensions, legally it is a collection of separate
and distinct entities.2 9
This structure raises a fundamental question: to what
extent is the parent corporation, incorporated under for-
eign law and based in another country, responsible for the
actions of its subsidiaries in the host country? In an eco-
nomic sense, of course, a parent is indeed responsible, for
it clearly and effectively controls the subsidiary's activities.
Legally, however, the answer is not so clear. If the parent
directs a subsidiary to reduce or close down operations in
the host country, to what extent will the parent be liable
for any resulting economic injury to the host country?
Further, if the reduction in operations leads to the insol-
vency of the subsidiary, to what extent will the parent be
responsible for paying the unsatisfied debts of and claims
against the subsidiary? If the subsidiary, at the parent's
direction, has produced and distributed defective goods
that caused wide-spread injury to persons or property in
the host country, to what extent will the parent be liable
to compensate the victims? Indeed, to what extent will
Union Carbide be liable for the injuries caused by its In-
28 Trisciuzzi, Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, in Regulating The
Multinational Enterprise: National and International Challenges 143, 151 (Fisher
& Turner eds. 1983).
29 R. Tindall, Multinational Enterprises at v (1975).
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dian subsidiary's plant in Bhopal? The answer to these
questions remains uncertain. Under U.S. law, the parent
corporation is not ordinarily responsible for the acts of its
subsidiaries. While American courts have on occasion
pierced "the corporate veil" - i.e., disregarded the cor-
porate entity - so as to hold the parent liable for the obli-
gations of its foreign subsidiaries, they have only been
willing to do so in exceptional cases.3
Because these considerations have engendered in host
country governments a great sense of ambivalence toward
foreign investment and multinational corporations, their
primary response to the problem has been one of regula-
tion. Viewing foreign investment as a mixed blessing,
with costs as well as benefits, most developing countries
have enacted rules and procedures whose primary objec-
tive is to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of
foreign investment projects in their territories. If the re-
sulting regulatory schemes - considered to be "barriers"
by Western countries - are to be altered or replaced by
international arrangements fostering the flow of capital,
one must first understand the reasons for their existence
and the policies behind their imposition by the host
country.
III. NATIONAL BARRIERS TO DIRECT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
Although the barriers to foreign investment vary from
country to country and demonstrate great diversity in
form and substance,3 ' one can group them into three ba-
sic categories: (A) controls over the entry of investment;
30 See, e.g.,Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, 456 F. Supp. 831,
841 (D.C. Del. 1978) (insufficient control to pierce the corporate veil); Pauley Pe-
troleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629 (Del. 1968) (plaintiff failed to
show evidence of fraud or other action sufficient to pierce the corporate veil). Cf
Fitz-Patrick v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 285 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1960) (complete
domination of subsidiary; incorporated only upon direction of Haitian
government).
31 For a detailed discussion of investment regulation, see W. Streng & J.
Salacuse, International Business Planning: Law and Taxation 19.05-.06 (1983).
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(B) operational controls over the project once it is estab-
lished; and (C) governmental actions affecting property
rights.
A. Controls Over Entry
International law recognizes the regulation by the host
country of foreign investment in its territory as a justified
act of national sovereignty. It is well settled in interna-
tional law that the host state has the right to control the
movement of capital into its territory, to regulate all mat-
ters pertaining to the acquisition and transfer of property
within its national boundaries, to determine the condi-
tions for the exercise of economic activity by natural or
legal persons, and to control the entry and activity of
aliens.3 2 Moreover, Article VI of the Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund specifically af-
firms the right of member states to maintain capital
controls. 3
Most countries have enacted "investment laws," "in-
vestment codes," or "joint venture laws," for the purpose
of regulating the entry and operation of foreign invest-
ment.3 4 While such legislation now seems to be a basic
element in the legal systems of almost every developing
country in the world, it is also to be found in certain in-
dustrialized nations, such as Canada, Australia, and Ja-
'2 A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors 40-41 (1962).
3 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VI,
§ 3, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. This Agreement established the
International Monetary Fund and set down the basic international monetary rules
for the Post-World War II era. Article VI, section 3 provides:
Controls of Capital Transfers
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements, but no member may exercise these
controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current trans-
actions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of
commitments, except as provided in Article VII, section 3(b) and in
Article XIV, section 2.
Id.
34 For a worldwide compendium of such legislation, see International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Investment Laws of the World (1972),
which currently consists of 12 volumes and is updated regularly.
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pan.35 In an effort to maximize the benefits and minimize
the costs of obtaining foreign capital, investment laws de-
fine the types of investment projects desired, specify in-
centives to be granted to desired projects, impose
controls on their operations, and establish a process for
screening investment proposals so as to determine
whether they meet the host country's requirements.3 6
Proposals which do not meet such criteria are rejected
and thereby denied entry to the host country. Even if they
are not formally rejected, the government may achieve the
same result by denying the investor needed privileges and
facilities for undertaking the project. The investment law
thus usually establishes an important "barrier" in the
form of such a project approval process.
The approval process, which usually involves negotia-
tion between the host government and the foreign inves-
tor, may result in the imposition of various conditions
upon the project's operation - conditions which the in-
vestor may not desire. For example, the government may
15 E.g., Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973, ch. 46 § 6, § 8(2), 1973-1974,
Can. Stat. 619; Regulations Respecting the Establishment of New Business in
Canada [P.C. 1975-1675 ofJuly 17, 1975]. Canada took measures to limit foreign
investment because by the mid-1960's foreign corporations in Canada controlled
60% of its manufacturing industry, 75% of its petroleum and natural gas industry,
and 60% of it mining industry. For background on the Canadian approach, see
generally G. Hughes, A Commentary on the Foreign Investment Review Act 50-
52 (1975); Frank & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Investment Control Experiment: The
Law, The Context and the Practice 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1975). Subsequently, Can-
ada undertook a program to reduce foreign control over its energy production
through the National Energy Program of Canada. See generally Olson, Foreign
Investment Restrictions on Canadian Energy Resources, 14 Int'l Law. 579 (1980).
-6 In this connection, Egypt's efforts to attract foreign investment after years of
being virtually closed to foreign capital are worthy of note. The primary legal
mechanism for opening the door that had been closed for so long is Law No. 43 of
1974, Garida Rasmia, No. 26, 27June 1974. For a discussion of this law, see gener-
ally Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment: The Framework for Economic
Openness, 9 Int'l Law. 647-60 (1975). Actual experience with that law led the Egyp-
tians to enact amendments to open the door to foreign investment even wider.
Salacuse & Parnall, Foreign Investment and Economic Openness in Egypt: Legal Problems
and Legislative Adjustments of the First Three Years, 12 Int'l Law. 759-77 (1978). Ulti-
mately, Egypt's efforts to attract foreign investment would not only affect its in-
vestment law, but its entire legal and political system as well. Salacuse, Back to
Contract: Implications of Peace and Openness For Egypt's Legal System, 28 Am. J. Comp.
L. 315-33 (1980).
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require that the project export a fixed percentage of its
production or use a minimum amount of local resources
in its activities. Other conditions may require the project
to take the form of a joint venture with local partners, or
that it be located in a particular region of the country that
the host government is seeking to develop. Such condi-
tions, sometimes called "performance requirements," are
often not specified in the actual investment law but are
introduced during the negotiations with the host govern-
ment. Their imposition may also be viewed as a barrier to
investment.
B. Operational Controls
Other inhibitions to the flow of capital reside in the
controls that host governments impose on the operations
of foreign investment projects. The precise nature of
these controls varies from country to country, and they
usually reflect the peculiarity of the host country's econ-
omy, politics, developmental objectives, and social poli-
cies. In most nations where foreign exchange is often in
short supply, controls over the acquisition and use of for-
eign exchange by the investment project constitute one of
the most powerful means by which the host country may
regulate the structure and operation of the project. Limi-
tations or prohibitions imposed on the availability of for-
eign exchange for debt servicing, repatriation of profits,
purchase of spare parts and raw materials, payment of for-
eign royalties, and ultimately repatriation of invested cap-
ital itself can significantly influence, and indeed,
ultimately curtail the operations of the project. Normally,
the rules on these matters are set down in the host coun-
try's foreign exchange laws and regulations; however, the
investment law will ordinarily include special provisions
for foreign investment projects.3 7 In addition, the appro-
.7 In the case of Egypt, the Egyptian government, viewing foreign investment as
a means to improve its foreign exchange reserves, originally took the position that
an approved investment project could repatriate profits only to the extent that it
had foreign earnings. See supra note 36 for a discussion of Egypt's efforts regard-
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priate governmental ministry or the Central Bank may
enter into a separate agreement or issue a license specify-
ing the particular privileges and controls applicable to the
project once it is approved.
Another area of control concerns the nationality of the
managers and other employees of the project. In view of
the host country's general objective of obtaining new
skills and technology and of creating employment for its
nationals, it will normally wish to maximize the employ-
ment of host country nationals; consequently it may re-
quire, by quota or other means, that the project shape its
employment practices accordingly and limit the number
of foreign nationals it hires. The government may also
require the project to develop a training plan for the de-
velopment of local personnel so that over time indigenous
employees may come to occupy virtually all positions in
the project.
A further type of related control is to be found in the
so-called joint venture requirement which permits the in-
vestor to undertake a project only in association with local
public or private capital. Several motives have prompted
host countries to favor or even require joint ventures.
One of the most important is the desire to integrate the
investment project into the economy of the country. Host
government officials believe that with significant local par-
ticipation, such integration is more likely to succeed than
if the project is wholly-owned by foreigners. In addition,
developing country governments consider that joint ven-
tures facilitate the creation of local management skills and
the transfer of techonology, while mitigating the real or
apparent foreign domination of the economy or impor-
tant economic sectors. Joint ventures may also facilitate
access by the local partner to the foreign partner's inter-
national marketing network. Moreover, it is argued that a
joint venture, as opposed to a wholly-owned subsidiary,
will be more responsive to government policies and con-
ing foreign investments. Eventually, Egypt was forced to take a more flexible po-
sition on the question. Salacuse & Parnall, supra note 36, at 770-71.
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duct its operations in the best interests of the country as a
whole. Finally, a joint venture places the host country
government and the local investor in a position to take
over the entire project through nationalization or negoti-
ated purchase; consequently, its use is viewed as contrib-
uting to the formation of nationally-owned industries and
economic activities.
The precise nature of the joint venture requirement
varies from country to country. In some, the requirement
is absolute in all cases and further provides that the for-
eign party may hold no more than 49% of the equity.38 In
others, a more flexible approach is taken. In Nigeria, for
example, the maximum amount of foreign equity will de-
pend upon the economic sector concerned. Thus, the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act of 1977 limits foreign
equity to 40% for certain types of enterprises, to 60% in
others, and prohibits foreign equity completely in yet a
third group .3  The investment laws of some countries,
such as Egypt, require foreign investment, as a general
principle, to take the form of joint ventures, but will ex-
empt foreign investors from this requirement in appropri-
ate cases.4 °
Numerous other types of controls exist in developing
countries; they include controls over prices, the use of la-
bor, the methods of finance, 41 and the importation of for-
eign technology. 42 While the investor may be able to
coexist with them, such operational controls, in many
38 See, e.g., Ethiopia: Joint Venture Establishment Proclamation No. 235/1983,
art. 4.
39 The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, No. 4 of 1972. For a discussion
of this legislation, see generally Jegede, The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 4
of 1972, Nig. L.J. 153-59 (1973).
40 Law No. 43, supra note 36, art. 4.
41 Some countries may forbid foreign investors from obtaining financing from
local banks and credit institutions.
42 Many developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Columbia and Peru, re-
quire prior government approval of technology transfer agreements between for-
eign suppliers and local firms. For a discussion of the Latin Americn experience,
see generally Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin America: A Decade of Control, 15 J.
World Trade L. 388 (1981).
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cases, may be so onerous as to be an insurmountable bar-
rier to undertaking the proposed investment project.
C. Governmental Actions Affecting Property Rights
Yet another barrier to foreign investment is the fear on
the part of the investor that once the investment is made
the host government will exercise its political power so as
to interfere with the investor's use and enjoyment of its
property in the host country. Such interference may take
a variety of forms, including outright confiscation, abro-
gation of contractual rights, forced "sale" of interests in
the project, and "creeping expropriation," a process
whereby the government increasingly imposes restrictions
and controls on the project so as to make it difficult to
continue in business at a profit, thus leading to the sale or
abandonment of the project to the government or local
private investors.43
The risk of governmental interference with the invest-
ment is very real,44 particularly in developing countries.
Unfortunately, the international community has yet to for-
mulate an effective legal mechanism to deal with the prob-
lem. The traditional Western position on expropriation is
that the taking by a state of alien property is wrongful
under international law if any of the following conditions
exist: (1) it is not for a public purpose; (2) it is discrimina-
tory; or (3) provision is not made for the payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.4 5 Many
developing countries would deny that the above state-
ment accurately summarizes the current international law
on the question. The position of much of the Third
43 See Weston, "Constructive Takings Under International Law: A Modest Foray Into
the Problem of Creeping Expropriation", 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 103 (1975); Vagts, Coercion
and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 17 (1978).
44 The United Nations identified 875 distinct acts of governmental takings of
foreign property in 62 countries during the period 1960-1974. See, e.g., Piper, New
Directions in the Protection of American-Owned Property Abroad, 4 Int'l Trade L.J. 315-30
(1979).
- G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law 4 (1969).
See also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
166, 185 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement].
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World appears to be embodied in article 2(c) of the
United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States:
2. Each state has the right.
• . .(c) to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer ownership
of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensa-
tion should be paid by the state adopting such measures,
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and
all circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any
case where the question gives rise to a controversy, it shall
be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing
State, and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually
agreed by all states concerned that other peaceful means
be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of states
and in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means. 46
While issues of whether a taking was for public purpose
or was discriminatory may be the subject of intense de-
bate between the investor and the host government in in-
dividual cases of expropriation, for all practical purposes
the essential question in any case of expropriation is that
of the adequacy of compensation. Generally, injured in-
vestors will raise objections on grounds of discrimination
or lack of public purpose only if the host country govern-
ment does not make satisfactory provision for
compensation.
While nearly all nations of the world would claim to rec-
ognize the principle that a state has the obligation to pay
compensation for property which it has expropriated,
they do not agree on the standard or the method to be
applied in determining appropriate compensation in indi-
vidual cases. For the United States, the correct standard
is "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation,"
which, for most U.S. investors, means "fair market value
46 Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. A/9946 Dec. 9, 1974, and G.A.
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. Doc. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in, 14 Int'l Legal Mat. 251 (1975).
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paid in freely transferable dollars."47 Developing coun-
tries, on the other hand, oppose such high standards of
valuation, and instead argue for "appropriate compensa-
tion ... taking into account . ..all circumstances that
the State considers pertinent. ' 48 In many instances, they
have claimed that they are obligated to pay only the book
value of the investment - that is, the original cost less
any depreciation. 49 On occasion, they have sought to de-
duct from book value alleged excessive or illegal profits
previously taken by the investor.5 0 Indeed, since they do
not view expropriation as per se illegal, host governments
sometimes seem to consider the justification for requiring
compensation to be the elimination of unjust enrichment
to the expropriating state, rather than the duty to give the
investor the value of what was lost.
5
'
Developing countries also argue that compensation
should take into account the ability of the host country to
pay. In fact, ability to pay is a major factor shaping in-
demnification in this area. For example, there is some evi-
dence suggesting that a distinction in practice exists
between large scale nationalizations of a whole industry
and limited government expropriations of specific proper-
ties. In the former situation, it is less likely the investor
will receive full compensation for the value of the prop-
erty taken because of the greater amount which the host
country government is obliged to pay.52
In addition to the amount of compensation, contro-
versy may also arise concerning the means and time of
47 Restatement, supra note 45, at 188-90.
48 Report of the Second Committee, supra note 46, at 225.
49 See Piper, supra note 44.
-o When Peru nationalized an American-owned oil company in 1969, it pro-
vided compensation of $71 million; however, it immediately attached this amount
until the company had paid $690.5 million allegedly owed to the Peruvian govern-
ment for oil that the company had illegally extracted since 1924. E.g., Huerta,
Peruvian Nationalizations and the Peruvian-American Compensation Agreements, 10 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1, 11-12 (1977).
51 See Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign
Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 179, 181-83 (1978).
52 Piper, supra note 44, at 323.
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payment. The "prompt, adequate and effective" formula-
tion, favored by western countries, would require that
payment be made as soon as is reasonable in light of the
international standard of justice, that it be in cash, or
readily convertible thereto, that it be convertible into the
currency of the investor, and that the investor be permit-
ted to withdraw the payment from the territory of the host
state.53 On the other hand, the expropriating state, which
is usually in difficult economic circumstances to begin
with, will press for long-term payment - often in low-in-
terest bonds - and in a form that is not readily converti-
ble into foreign exchange. Indeed, the host government
may even seek, as a condition for compensation, that any
funds received by the investor be reinvested in the
country.
Beyond the issue of the substantive rules to be applied
in expropriation cases are the questions of proper forum
and of fair procedures to settle such disputes. Obviously,
a multinational corporation would be reluctant to leave
decisions on expropriation exclusively to host country
courts, particularly because such disputes invariably bring
the corporation into conflict with host governments that
often influence, if not control, the judiciaries in their
countries. On the other hand, developing countries are
equally skeptical of the treatment they would receive in
the courts of capital exporting countries.54
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE REMOVAL
OF INVESTMENT BARRIERS
The above mentioned entry controls, operational con-
trols, and uncertainties over property rights together con-
stitute, in the eyes of Western investors, significant
-3 Restatement, supra note 45, at 189-90.
-4 The availability of foreign investment insurance, offered by most capital-ex-
porting countries, helps to reduce this barrier somewhat. Generally, such pro-
grams offer insurance against the three non-commercial risks of currency non-
convertibilty, expropriation, and war, revolution and insurrection. For a discus-
sion of the U.S. Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC), see generally W.
Streng &J. Salacuse, supra note 31, at 28.01-.12.
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barriers to investment. It is the contention of this article
that if a way can be found to lower these barriers - even
if only partially - then the flow of capital between the
industrialized states and the less developed countries will
be significantly increased. Although Western nations
have strongly condemned these barriers and have urged
their elimination, such exhortation has done little to
change the situation. In general, Western governments
have not shown great understanding of the reasons for
these controls and barriers, nor have they sought to ac-
commodate the legitimate concerns of the Third World.
As has been argued above, many of these barriers have a
legitimate rationale in the eyes of the host country: to
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of direct
foreign investment.
Just as denunciations of trade barriers prior to World
War II had little effect on their elimination,55 and just as
real progress in trade relations only took place through
mutual agreements developed after the War (particularly
through the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade), so
too has Western governmental exhortation had little im-
pact in fostering investment in developing countries.
Real progress in encouraging direct foreign investment
will only be made through agreements which accommo-
date the interests of both the developing world and the
industrialized nations. Thus, it would seem that only
through some form of treaty arrangement will genuine
progress be made in this area. In light of this hypothesis,
two basic approaches become apparent: (1) a series of bi-
lateral agreements on foreign investment between indi-
vidual capital-exporting and capital-importing states, or
(2) one or more multilateral agreements which include
several such states within a single treaty framework. Each
of these approaches will be considered in turn.
5 See, e.g., Bidwell, The New American Tariff, 9 Foreign Affairs 13-26 (1930); Bid-
well, Trade, Tariffs, The Depression, 10 Foreign Affairs 391-401 (1932).
1985] 989
990 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
V. THE BILATERAL APPROACH
A. Background
Like a bilateral trade agreement that facilitates com-
merce between the two countries concerned, a bilateral
investment treaty may also serve to accelerate the flow of
capital between two countries by establishing a mutually
agreed-upon framework within which barriers to invest-
ment might be lowered. While general bilateral commer-
cial agreements have a long history, 56 the specialized
bilateral investment treaty is a relatively new phenomenon
whose origins lie in the post-World War II era.
Throughout its history, the United States has entered
into numerous bilateral economic treaties containing pro-
visions which may have limited relevance for investments
by U.S. nationals within the territory of the treaty partner.
Traditionally, the United States has titled such agree-
ments as "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion."' 57 As their name indicates, these have dealt
essentially with commerce and shipping. To the extent
that they have been concerned with the rights of U.S. per-
sons to do business and to own property in the territory of
the other treaty partner, treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation have had relevance for U.S. investment
abroad.
After World War II, with the great expansion in foreign
investment by American nationals and corporations, the
United States undertook a program to conclude a network
of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion which specifically sought to facilitate direct foreign
investment.5 From 1946 until 1966, the U.S. concluded
5c For a history of U.S. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, see
generally Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 Minn. L.
Rev. 805-24 (1958). See also R. Wilson, United States Commercial Treaties and
International Law (1960).
-1 Walker, supra note 56, at 805.
58 Norton, The Renegotiability of United States Bilateral Commercial Treaties with the
Member States of the European Economic Community, 8 Tex. Int'l L. Rev. 299, 306-07
(1973).
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approximately twenty-two such treaties, and their primary
aim was to facilitate the flow of American capital abroad.59
By the mid 1960's, however, the program appeared to
come to a halt, primarily because of the unwillingness of
the newly independent developing countries, suspicious
of the consequences of direct foreign investment, to make
the types of guarantees requested by the United States
with respect to U.S. investments. 60
At the same time, the late 1960's and the 1970's wit-
nessed the erection of numerous barriers to foreign in-
vestment by the developing world, whose members, with
few exceptions, viewed private foreign capital and multi-
national corporations with great ambivalence. In addition
to enacting their own national regulatory schemes, dis-
cussed above, the developing countries pressed for the
promulgation of international codes of conduct to control
the activities of multinational enterprises, the primary
sources of direct foreign investment.61
Whereas the United States sought to include invest-
ment provisions within general treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation, the European capital-export-
ing states took the lead in the post-war era in seeking to
conclude specific bilateral investment treaties with devel-
oping countries. In furtherance of this approach, Euro-
pean countries prepared model and prototype investment
treaties to serve as a basis of negotiation. Their efforts
appear to have achieved some success for they managed
to conclude approximately 150 specialized bilateral in-
59 Note, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 14 Law & Pol. Int'l Bus.
273, 276 (1983).
W ICC, Bilateral Treaties for International Investment 8 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as ICC].
6 1 The developing countries have devoted particular efforts to obtaining such a
code of conduct through the United Nations. U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations, Transnational Corporations: A Code of Conduct, Formulations by the Chair-
man, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.2/8 (1978). See also Commission on Transnational
Corporations, Progress Made Towards the Establishment of the New International Eco-
nomic Order: The Role of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/74.(1980) at
27-30.
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vestment treaties by the end of 1979.62 The reason for
the greater success of the European program is not com-
pletely clear; however, it may well be attributed to the fact
that Europeans were less demanding than were the Amer-
icans with respect to guarantees on free convertibility of
local currency, the abolition of performance require-
ments, and the elimination of screening procedures. 63
With the inauguration of the Reagan administration in
1981, the United States also undertook to foster capital
flows through a program of specific bilateral investment
treaties with developing countries. At the International
Meeting on Cooperation and Development in October,
1981, at Cancun, Mexico, President Reagan stressed the
role of private capital in aiding the developing world.64 In
order to make private capital a more active force for de-
velopment, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative
drafted a model investment treaty for use in negotia-
tions.65 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. and Egypt undertook
negotiations resulting in the Treaty Between the United
States and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, signed September 29, 1982.66 Since then, similar
treaties have been signed with Panama (October 27,
1982),67 Senegal (December, 1983),68 and Haiti (Decem-
62 ICC, supra note 60, at 7. This publication lists all international bilateral trea-
ties to which developing countries are parties and containing provisions on the
protection of foreign property at 13-24. For a listing of over 200 bilateral invest-
ment treaties (including those to which the U.S. is a party), as of October 1, 1982,
see 21 Int'l Legal Mat. 1208-09 (1982). See also Aksen, The Case for Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, in Private Investors Abroad 357, 361 (1981).
-3 Coughlin, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Answer to Performance Require-
ments?, in Regulating the Multinational Enterprise: National and International
Challenges 129, 136-37 (Fisher & Turner eds. 1983).
See Note, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 Law & Pol. Int'l Bus.
273 (1983).
w, Id. The text of the Model Treaty, as of January 21, 1983, is reprinted in W.
Streng &J. Salacuse, supra note 54, at Appendix 27D [hereinafter cited as Model
Treaty].
- The U.S.-Egyptian Treaty is reprinted in 21 Int'l Legal Mat. 927 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as U.S.-Egypt Treaty].
67 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama
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ber, 1983).69 Difficulties encountered in negotiations
have subsequently led to revisions of the model treaty, the
latest version being that of February 21, 1984.70
As of September, 1984, negotiations were also under
way with Costa Rica, Morocco, China, Honduras, and El
Salvador. None of the signed agreements have yet been
transmitted to the Senate for ratification. Apparently, the
U.S. Trade Representative's office intends to send a
"package" of several such treaties at one time to the Sen-
ate so as to emphasize the importance of the bilateral in-
vestment treaty program. It would also like to wait until
an agreement has been signed with a commercially signifi-
cant developing country. In the meanwhile, however, the
program has encountered complications in that both
Egypt and Panama have asked to reopen negotiations be-
cause their governments, upon study of the treaties, are
dissatisfied with certain of their provisions. 71 Nonethe-
less, as the most significant current example of the bilat-
eral approach to building a legal framework for direct
foreign investments, the U.S. model treaty is worthy of
examination.
B. The U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.
1. In General.
The current version of the U.S. model bilateral invest-
ment treaty,72 like its predecessors, seeks to eliminate all
three of the above-described barriers to direct foreign in-
vestment. In doing so, it adopts a strongly Western capi-
talist approach to direct foreign investment and exhibits
relatively little concern for the policies and sensitivities of
Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, reprinted in 21 Int'l
Legal Mat. 1227 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Panama Treaty].
- USTR Hopes to Deliver Eight Bilateral Investment Treaties to Senate This Year, 20
U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) 950-51 (1984).
6, Id.
7o For the text of the Revised Model Treaty, see 20 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA)
960-63 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Revised Model Treaty].
71 See supra note 68.
72 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70.
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host country governments in the Third World. Indeed,
the aim of the current U.S. bilateral investment treaty pro-
gram seems to allow the free flow of U.S. direct invest-
ment to developing countries; consequently, it may be
viewed as an attempt to impose an "open-door policy" on
its treaty partners. It is probably for this reason that the
treaty program has been slow in making progress. The
issues encountered in the U.S. bilateral investment treaty
program are similar to those which other capital-export-
ing countries have met in negotiating similar treaties with
the third world. It is worthwhile examining these issues,
as well as the proposed solutions, in order to understand
the problems of creating an effective international legal
framework for facilitating capital and technological flows
to developing countries.
2. The Beneficiaries of the Treaty.
One of the initial issues to be confronted in the negotia-
tion of a bilateral investment treaty is the precise determi-
nation of the persons and institutions who will benefit
from it. In considering this issue, one must remember
that although reciprocity and mutuality of treatment are
fundamental principles upon which any bilateral invest-
ment treaty is based and that although the treaty, in theory,
is to facilitate investment in both countries, in fact, in cases
of a treaty between a developing nation and an industrial-
ized state, the industrialized country will be the source
and the developing country will be the recipient of virtu-
ally all investments undertaken. For example, in the pro-
posed agreement between Egypt and the United States, 7
it is obvious that Egypt will be the primary site of invest-
ment and that Egyptians themselves will invest very little
in the United States.
In view of this situation, the approach of the two parties
to defining the beneficiaries of the bilateral investment
treaty may come into conflict. The capital-exporting
7s See U.S.-Egypt Treaty, supra note 65.
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country will generally seek broad coverage that will en-
compass as many of its nationals as possible, while the
capital-importing company will usually seek a more lim-
ited scope of coverage. In particular, the capital-import-
ing country may be reluctant to grant the benefits of a
bilateral treaty to persons and companies having only a
tenuous relationship with the other treaty partner. To al-
low the treaty to benefit persons or companies who are
nationals of or primarily associated with countries with
which it has no treaty relationship would be, in effect, to
abandon its right to negotiate corresponding privileges
and obligations from those countries.
If all foreign investments were made by natural per-
sons, the problem of defining the beneficiaries of the
treaty would be relatively simple; the beneficiaries would
be defined as the nationals of the two treaty partners. In
fact, of course, a foreign investment is almost never made
by a natural person, but rather by a corporation or other
juridical person. Moreover, in many cases the capital and
technology for an investment project do not flow directly
from one treaty country to the other. For tax, financial or
other business reasons, a U.S. multinational corporation
may often make an investment in a developing country
through a subsidiary located in a third country. In addi-
tion, the fact that foreign investment projects increasingly
take the form of joint ventures with nationals from third
countries may complicate even further the problem of de-
termining the beneficiaries of a bilateral investment
treaty.
Essentially, the following three types of investments
have caused difficulties in negotiating the coverage of bi-
lateral treaties: (1) investments made by a company or-
ganized in a treaty country by nationals of a third country;
(2) investments made by a company organized in a third
country by nationals of a treaty country; and (3) invest-
ments made by a company in which nationals of a third
country have a substantial interest.
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The revised U.S. model bilateral agreement74 seeks to
cover all three situations in which U.S. nationals are in-
volved. Thus, under article l(1)(b) investments are de-
fined as "every kind of investment in the territory of one
party owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by na-
tionals or companies of the other party, such as equity,
debt and service and investment contracts . . . . - A
"company of a party" is defined to mean "any kind of cor-
poration, company, association, or other organization, le-
gally constituted under the laws and regulations of a party
or a political subdivision thereof, whether or not organ-
ized for pecuniary gain, or privately or governmentally
owned."' 76 The use of the words "directly or indirectly"
in the definition of investment would appear to permit a
U.S. multinational to make an investment in a treaty coun-
try through a subsidiary incorporated in a third country,
since the U.S. multinational is making the investment "in-
directly" through its third country subsidiary. This result,
however, is not absolutely clear.
It should be noted that the U.S. model investment
treaty, like many bilateral investment treaties, seeks to
prevent nationals and companies from third countries
from benefiting from the U.S. bilateral treaty merely by
incorporating the investing company in the United States.
Thus, the model treaty contains the following condition:
Each party reserves the right to deny any company the
advantages of this treaty if nationals of any third country
control such company and, in the case of a company of the
other party, that company has no substantial business ac-
tivities in the territory of the other party or is controlled
by nationals of a third country with which the denying
party does not maintain normal economic relations.77
Since the treaty does not define "control," controversy
may develop in individual cases as to whether nationals of
74 See Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70.
75 Id. art. I(1)(b).
76 Id. art. I(l)(a).
77 Id. art. 1(2).
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a third country do or do not control an investing company
organized in a treaty country. For example, if the U.S.
company has substantial foreign ownership, will that fact
jeopardize its ability to benefit from the treaty? On the
other hand, will the fact that Americans own 51% of the
shares of the investing company establish conclusively
that the company is controlled by American nationals?
An earlier version of the U.S. model agreement was more
specific on this point, for it defined "own or control" as
"ownership or control that is direct or indirect, including
ownership or control exercised through subsidiaries or af-
filiates, wherever located."'7 This provision no longer ap-
pears in the prototype agreement, although it was
included in the Egypt-United States Bilateral Investment
Treaty79 and the Panama-United States Investment
Treaty80 as originally negotiated.
By contrast, the bilateral investment agreements of the
United Kingdom appear to deny the benefits of the treaty
whenever investments are made through companies or-
ganized in third countries. On the other hand, they do
not seem to require that companies organized in a treaty
country be controlled by nationals of the treaty country.8 '
Since some U.K. bilateral agreements by their terms apply
only to investments approved in writing by the con-
tracting party in whose territory they are made, 2 such
contracting party is able to deny the benefits of the treaty
at the time approval is sought in cases where third country
nationals control the investing company.
78 Model Treaty, supra note 64, art. I(d).
79 U.S.-Egypt Treaty, supra note 65, art. I(d).
80 U.S.-Panama Treaty, supra note 66, art. I(e).
$I See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, April
27, 1976, United Kingdom-Indonesia, art. I(d), 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 62 (CMD
6858) [hereinafter cited as United Kingdom-Indonesia Treaty].
82 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion of Investment Capital and for the Pro-
tection of Investments, April 11, 1979, United Kingdom-Thailand, art. 3(1), 1979
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 99 (CMD 7478) [hereinafter cited as United Kingdom-Thailand
Treaty].
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3. Entry Controls.
One of the aims of a bilateral investment treaty is to
achieve a mutual reduction in entry barriers so as to facili-
tate the flow of investment between the two countries
concerned. The U.S. approach to this issue, as illustrated
by the Model Treaty and the U.S.-Panama and U.S.-Egypt
Treaties, is basically to secure treatment for U.S. invest-
ments equal to that accorded to nationals of the host
country or to nationals of most favored third countries,
whichever is the most favorable. Article 11(1) of the U.S.-Pan-
ama Treaty, the U.S.-Egypt Treaty and the Model Treaty
provides:
Each party shall permit and treat investment, and activities
associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that
accorded in like situations to investment or associated ac-
tivities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals
and companies of any third party, whichever is the most
favorable, subject to the right of each party to make or
maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors on
matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.8 3
Thus, the basic standard accorded the U.S. investor is na-
tional treatment or most favored national treatment,
whichever is the most favorable. The breadth of this obliga-
tion is even greater than one might ordinarily suppose.
For one thing, the word "company" is defined to include
both private and government-owned corporations. 84
Thus, in socialist countries, where the primary domestic
investors are usually government corporations, foreign
private companies, according to the treaty, are to be given
equal treatment with such government-owned entities.85
83 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. 11(l).
84 Id. art. i(l)(a).
85 An earlier version of the model treaty had made this position explicit, for it
stated that:
Conditions of competitive equality should be maintained where in-
vestments owned or controlled by a Party or its agencies or instru-
mentalities are in competition, within the territory of such Party,
with privately owned or controlled investments of nationals or com-
panies of the other Party. In such situations, the privately owned or
controlled investments shall receive treatment which is equivalent
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As noted above, article II(1) allows the parties to main-
tain limited exceptions to the standard of national or most
favored treatment, whichever is the most favorable, if
such exceptions fall within one of the sectors or matters
specified by the parties in the annex to the treaty. Thus,
the U.S. prototype exempts the United States from grant-
ing equality in such economic sectors as air transporta-
tion, coastal shipping, banking, insurance, and the
ownership and operation of radio and television stations.
But even in such excepted areas, the Model Treaty re-
quires the parties to treat one another no less favorably
than they treat investment in those areas from third
countries .86
In seeking to obtain the more favorable of national
treatment or most favored nation treatment for its invest-
ments, the U.S. appears to demand greater privileges for
its investors than have other capital exporting states
through their own bilateral treaties. For example, certain
of the United Kingdom's bilateral treaties only require
most favored national treatment for its investments.87
In addition to obtaining favorable treatment, the U.S.
Model Treaty seeks to lower other barriers to investment.
First, it attempts to reduce the impediments created by
pre-investment screening. The Model Treaty states that
neither party shall be precluded from prescribing special
formalities in connection with the establishment of invest-
ments, provided that such formalities do not impair the
substance of any of the rights set forth in the treaty. 88
Next, to reduce entry barriers, the U.S. Model Bilateral
with regard to any special economic advantages accorded the gov-
ernmentally owned or controlled investments.
Model Treaty, supra note 64, art. 11(6). The Egyptian treaty included this provi-
sion, but the Panama treaty did not. Later revisions of the treaty do not contain
the provision.
86 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. II(I).
87 E.g., United Kingdom-Indonesia Treaty, supra note 80, art. 4. But see Agree-
ment for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 11, 1975, United
Kingdom-Egypt, art. 2, 1976 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 97 (CMD -), which grants both
national and most favored nation treatment.
88 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. X(2).
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Investment Treaty seeks to eliminate the imposition of
performance requirements - a prevalent practice in the
negotiation and approval of proposed foreign investment
projects in many developing countries. Article 11(5) stipu-
lates that
neither party shall impose performance requirements as a
condition of establishment, expansion, or maintenance of
investments owned by nationals or companies of the other
party, which require or enforce commitments to export
goods produced or which specify that goods or services
must be purchased locally, or which impose other similar
requirements.89
By comparison the U.K. investment treaties make no ref-
erence at all to performance requirements.
In general, the U.S. treaty provisions on entry may be
overly ambitious. In effect, they require a host country to
accept a radical transformation of its domestic economic
policies, particularly if it has accorded its public sector a
major role in national development. Egypt was evidently
quite sensitive on this point, for the resulting Egyptian
Treaty on these issues departs significantly from the lan-
guage of the model.
4. Operational Controls.
With respect to the treatment of the investment project
once established, the Model Treaty before 1984 sought to
guarantee the investor the more favorable of national or
most favored nation treatment on a broad variety of speci-
fied matters, including the establishment of branches, the
organization of companies under local laws, the making of
contracts, the acquisition of personal property, and the
borrowing of funds.90 Perhaps, as a result of opposition
encountered in negotiations, the Model Treaty now sets
down a general standard to govern the treatment to be
89 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. 11(3).
Model Treaty, supra note 65, art. 11(l). Language to this effect was included
in the U.S.-Egypt Treaty, but not the U.S.-Panama Treaty.
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accorded an investment once it is established."' This gen-
eral standard calls for "fair and equitable treatment,"
"full protection and security" and "treatment no less than
that required by international law."
It remains to be seen whether this general standard will
be interpreted to guarantee the investor equality of treat-
ment in making contracts, establishing subsidiaries, and
the other matters specified in the earlier version of the
model treaty. The latest version is specific, however, on
two matters often subject to operational controls: cur-
rency transfers and the employment of expatriate
managers.
The article on transfers appears to exempt the U.S. in-
vestor from any national system of exchange control by
providing that "[e]ach [p]arty shall permit all transfers re-
lated to an investment to be made freely and without de-
lay in to and out of its territory. ' 92 Such transfers cover a
broad variety of transactions, including dividends, inter-
est, capital gains, royalty payments, management and
technical assistance fees, payments arising out of an in-
vestment dispute, payments made under contract (includ-
ing amortization of principal and accrued interest
payments made pursuant to a loan agreement), proceeds
from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an invest-
ment, and additional contributions to capital for the main-
tenance or development of an investment.93 Such
transfers are to be made in freely convertible currency at
the prevailing market rate of exchange. 4
The broad scope of article VI is somewhat unrealistic in
91 Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. 11(2). This article provides in perti-
nent part:
Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treat-
ment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be
accorded treatment less than that required by international law.
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory
measures the management operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion or disposal of investments . . ..
92 Id. art. IV.
9, Id. art. IV(l).
94 Id. art. IV(2).
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view of the monetary situation of most developing coun-
tries today, where foreign exchange is in exceedingly
short supply. Indeed, many countries may simply not be
in a position to live up to such obligations at the present
time. The U.K. treaties, by contrast, seem to recognize
this difficulty. While they guarantee repatriation of capi-
tal, profits, and earnings, they also grant each party, in
"exceptional financial or economic circumstances, to ex-
ercise equitably and in good faith powers conferred by its
laws." 95 This provision justifies the application of ex-
change control laws.
Controls by the host government over expatriate work-
ers - particularly at the management level - are another
major concern of developing countries. The U.S. model
bilateral treaty seeks to avoid such controls with a sweep-
ing provision: "Companies which are legally constituted
under the applicable laws or regulations of one Party, and
which are investments, shall be permitted to engage top
managerial personnel of their choice, regardless of
nationality.' '96
5. Governmental Actions Affecting Property Rights.
The U.S. model bilateral investment treaty adopts a
definitely western approach to the subject of expropria-
tion. Article III provides that an investment may not be
expropriated or nationalized, either directly or indirectly,
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nation-
alization; except for a public purpose, in a non-discrimi-
natory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation; and in accordance with due pro-
cess of law and the general principles set down in the
treaty.97 The measure of compensation is the fair market
value of the expropriated investment immediately before
the expropriation took place or became known. The
model treaty also provides for interest at a commercially
95 See, e.g., United Kingdom-Indonesia Treaty, supra note 81, art. 6.
- Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. 11(4).
97 Id. art. 111(l).
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reasonable rate from the time of expropriation until pay-
ment is made. Compensation is to be paid without delay,
be fully realizable, and be freely transferable at the pre-
vailing market rate of exchange on the date of
98expropriation.
The treaty provides for the resolution of investment
disputes by reference to the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an affiliate of
the World Bank that resolves disputes through arbitra-
tion. 99 Party countries to the bilateral investment treaty
consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID for the resolution
of such investment disputes. 00
A second area of protection under the model treaty
concerns compensation for property damage due to war
and similar events. Under article 111(3), if an investment
is injured due to war (or other armed conflict), revolution,
a state of national emergency, insurrection, civil distur-
bances or similar events, the host country is to accord the
foreign investor treatment no less favorable than that
which it accords to its own nationals or companies or to
nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is
the most favorable treatment, as regards any measure
which the host government might adopt with regard to
such losses.' 0' An earlier version of the treaty granted
even greater protection from a requisition or the destruc-
tion of property by the host country's forces or authori-
ties. Under its terms, in any case where such loss was not
caused in a combat action and was not required by the
necessity of the situation, the host country was required to
provide restitution or compensation based on the fair
98 Id.
99 ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. The United States ratified the
Convention in 1966, and it entered into force in the United States as of October
14, 1966. As of March 1984, eighty-five countries had ratified the Convention to
become members of ICSID. ICSID's membership includes both industrialized
and developing countries.
- Revised Model Treaty, supra note 70, art. VI(3)(b).
- Id. art. 111(3).
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market value of the property damaged. 0 2
G. Evaluation
Thus far, the bilateral approach to forging an interna-
tional legal framework for direct foreign investment has
had only moderate success at best. Nonetheless, the
treaty-making process in which the capital-importing and
capital-exporting nations have been engaged has served
to delineate the differences between them and to begin
the articulation of a few basic principles which may gain
more general acceptance in the future. In this respect, the
attempt to define substantive standards on expropriation
and to use the facilities of ICSID can be viewed as very
positive developments. On the other hand, the bilateral
process, particularly between parties of unequal political
and economic power may lead to over-reaching. In this
respect, the U.S. model bilateral treaty appears to reflect
the peculiarly American view of the rights of private for-
eign investment, a view which many developing countries
do not share. Its primary focus is on encouraging private
investment, and it does little to cope with the concerns of
host countries with respect to the undesirable behavior of
foreign investors, particularly multinational enterprises.
Whether the existence of the current stringent financial
situation in the Third World will force developing coun-
tries to accept the treaty is not altogether clear. Even if
they do, the failure of the treaty to accommodate suffi-
ciently the interests of developing countries raises serious
questions about the long-term durability of such agree-
ments and about their ability to form the basis of an ex-
tensive bilateral treaty network between the United States
and numerous developing nations. Although countries
with close ties to the United States (such as Egypt, Haiti,
and Costa Rica) may accede to this treaty for political rea-
sons, one wonders seriously if the larger developing coun-
tries, which are the most attractive investment sites, will
102 Model Treaty, supra note 65, art. IV(2).
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be so inclined. It is the opinion of this writer that the ap-
proach of the Reagan administration will ultimately affect
only a relatively few developing countries, and that the
world will have to seek other solutions in order to en-
courage the flow of private capital to the Third World.
VI. A MULTILATERAL APPROACH
In order to encourage the flow of direct foreign invest-
ment to the developing countries, particulary at a time
when other forms of development finance are insufficient,
it is suggested that the capital-exporting and capital-im-
porting states should join together to create a multilateral
treaty framework for this purpose. Whereas a bilateral
approach to the problem is likely to yield only fragmen-
tary results, it is hoped that a multilateral approach will
provide a comprehensive global framework for invest-
ment flows. Such a multilateral approach, which seeks to
accommodate the interests of both the capital-importing
states and the capital-exporting states, might induce
broad participation by developing countries, many of
which might refrain for political reasons from entering
into bilateral investment treaties with individual Western
countries. With few financial options, Third World coun-
tries may now be more willing than ever to reduce the
barriers that inhibit investment flows to their territories.
A multilateral treaty, once concluded, could prove to be a
more durable framework than would bilateral agreements
which are subject to the changing policies of changing
governments. Indeed, it is conceivable that such a multi-
lateral investment treaty - a General Agreement on Direct In-
ternational Investment - might prove to be a stimulus for
the flow of international capital in the same way that the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade stimulated in-
ternational trade in the post-World War II era.
The attainment of such a multilateral treaty will not be
easy; it will certainly be considerably more difficult than
concluding a bilateral investment treaty. Negotiations will
be lengthy and complex, with no assurance of success.
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Prior to the start of negotiations, numerous difficult ques-
tions would have to be resolved, including agreement
upon the institution under whose auspices they would be
conducted. Although the resolution of such questions is
beyond the scope of this paper, one might suggest that
the World Bank may be an appropriate sponsoring au-
thority. The World Bank, which includes both capital-im-
porting and capital-exporting countries, seeks to promote
international investment but is also sensitive to the inter-
ests of developing countries. For this reason, it took the
lead in developing the International Centre [for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes, a multilateral institution
whose members include countries from both the industri-
alized and the Third World. 03
The idea of a multilateral approach to capital flows is
not new; however, few such attempts have been successful
either on a global or a regional basis. One significant ex-
ception is the Treaty of Rome, which established the Eu-
ropean Common Market and provides for freedom of
capital movement (article 67)104 and freedom of establish-
ment (article 52) 105 among the territories of the member
states. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, a group consisting primarily of non-Com-
munist industrialized states, has tried to develop a Code
of Liberalization of Capital Movements10 6 since 1961;
however, it has not received unanimous, unqualified ac-
ceptance of all OECD members. By virtue of the Code,
OECD members agreed progressively to abolish among
one another restrictions on the movement of capital to
the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation.
103 For background on ICSID, see generally ICSID, Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States: Analyses of
Documents Concerning the Origin and Formation of the Convention (1970).
- See generally 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1602-1752H.
-o See generally id. 1302-1495. For a discussion of the effect of the Treaty on the
movement of capital, see generally Lang, The Right of Establishment of Companies and
Free Movement of Capital in the European Economic Community, in International Trade,
Investment and Organization 288 (W. LaFave & P. Hay eds. 1967).
lo, OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (1973, updated ed.
1978).
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Another example of a regional multilateral treaty is the
Agreement on the Investment and Movement of Capital
Among the Arab States, a multilateral convention con-
cluded in 1970 among members of the Arab League;1 0 7
however, it has been subject to the political vicissitudes of
the Arab worlf.
Thus far, one of the most successful multilateral efforts
aimed at encburaging foreign investment in the Third
World is the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
which established the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes. The basic premise of ICSID is
that the existence of a multilateral, neutral body to which
disputes might be referred would reduce investor con-
cerns about expropriation and other governmental inter-
ference and therefore encourage them to undertake
investments in developing countries. After several years
of inactivity, ICSID has begun to engage in increasing ar-
bitration of international investment disputes.0 8
Since the early 1970's, the world has also witnessed an-
other type of multilateral effort concerned with foreign in-
vestment; however, the focus of this effort has not been
on the liberalization of capital movement, but rather at
the regulation of the conduct of the investor - particu-
larly the multinational corporation. Thus, for several
years, various :international organizations including the
OECD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, the International Chamber of Commerce, and
the International Labor Organization, to name a few, have
been engaged in work aimed at developing a code whose
purpose is to regulate the conduct of multinational enter-
prises. 109 The aim of these codes of conduct is to set
down basic rules or guidelines to govern the practices of
107 See Salacuse, Arab Capital and Trilateral Ventures in the Middle East: Is Three a
Crowd?, in Rich and Poor States in the Middle East 129, 146-47 (M. Kerr & E.
Yassine eds. 1982).
108 See ICSID, Ann. Rep. 1984, at 8. As of July 2, 1984, 87 countries had be-
come members of ICSID. Id. at 6.
- For a discussion from various perspectives of the attempts to prepare codes
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multinational corporations in such areas as competition,
taxation, employment relations, transfer of technology,
information, and disclosure." 0 Thus far, the effort to se-
cure a binding code of conduct has been no more success-
ful than has the effort to secure a multilateral treaty to
facilitate the free movement of capital.
As can be seen, international investment has thus been
the subject of two basic efforts: (1) an effort to liberalize
the movement of capital; and (2) an effort to regulate the
conduct of the multinational investor. For the most part,
these concerns have been addressed in separate and dis-
tinct arenas. Neither has achieved success in establishing
a definite multilateral framework to achieve its goals. The
failure of the Codes of Conduct may be attributed to their
failure to accommodate the interests of developed coun-
tries, the home of most multinational enterprises."' Sim-
ilarly, any effort to facilitate investment flows will not
succeed unless it accommodates host country concerns
about the behavior of multinational corporations. On the
assumption that any successful multilateral treaty frame-
work must accommodate the interests of both the devel-
oping countries and of the capital-exporting countries, it
is suggested that the negotiations for the proposed Gen-
eral Agreement on Direct International Investment ad-
dress both the issue of investment encouragement and the
issue of investor regulation. In effect, the developing
countries and the developed countries would seek to
strike a bargain whereby the developing countries would
facilitate the flow of investment capital and allow ade-
quate returns and security to the capital-exporting states,
while the developed countries would agree to recognize
and enforce rules which would protect the developing
of conduct, see generally Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises (N. Horn ed. 1980).
1 0 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See also Rubin, Transnational Corpo-
rations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between Interna-
tional Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 30 Am. U.L. Rev. 903, (198 1).
I Trisciuzzi, supra note 27, at 159.
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country from the more objectionable forms of behavior by
multinational investors and enterprises.
The precise content of the proposed multilateral invest-
ment treaty would, of course, depend on lengthy complex
negotiations between industrialized and developing coun-
tries. At this point, one can do no more than speculate on
the results. For example, in return for protection against
expropriation, the industrialized countries might agree to
the principle of holding multinational corporations liable
for the wrongful acts of their local subsidiaries in host
countries. Similarly, generalized guarantees on repatria-
tion of earnings and profits might be accompanied by
principles obligating home countries of multinationals to
enforce sanctions against bribery, unfair trade practices,
and other wrongful behavior in the host country. Regard-
less of the precise content, no treaty will result unless it
expresses a genuine mutuality of interests of the diverse
parties to the negotiating process. It must embody a fun-
damental bargain between the industrialized nations and
the Third World. In short, it must rest on a basic "North-
South deal."
In addition to promulgating rules, the proposed Gen-
eral Agreement on Direct International Investment might
also establish institutions to facilitate investment flows.
For example, it might lay the foundations for a multilat-
eral investment insurance organization, whose sharehold-
ers would be both capital-exporting and capital-importing
states and whose mission would be to provide insurance
to approved foreign investment projects against the non-
commercial risks of expropriation, currency non-con-
vertability, and armed conflict. 1 2 It might also create an
institution to finance and/or conduct feasibility studies of
investment opportunities in developing countries. The
lack of funding for feasibility studies has, in more than
one case, been an insurmountable obstacle to third world
investment.
21 The World Bank has been studying a similar proposal for several years.
Shihata, supra note 21, at 6.
1985] 1009
1010 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE (50
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposal for a General Agreement on Direct Inter-
national Investment may seem highly fanciful in the con-
text of the tensions that currently exist between the
industrialized and the developing countries. It is sug-
gested, however, that a multilateral treaty that seeks to ac-
commodate the interests of both groups and that
proceeds on the basis of genuine mutuality is the only re-
alistic way to reduce these tensions. Having engaged in
unproductive polemics for nearly twenty years, the devel-
oped and developing countries may have finally reached a
juncture in time when they are ready for a more produc-
tive dialogue. The Third World's increasing need for in-
vestment capital, its lack of other realistic financial
alternatives, and its growing realization that foreign in-
vestment can yield positive results may have created an
increased willingness to consider a multilateral treaty that
seeks to take account of the concerns of both capital-ex-
porting and capital-importing countries. Similarly, the
desire by capital-exporting states to take advantage of
economic opportunities in the Third World, when cou-
pled with a recognition that certain practices of multina-
tional corporations should indeed be limited, may lead to
a growing understanding of the interests of developing
countries. Thus, the propitious moment may have arrived
when the initiative for a multilateral treaty should be un-
dertaken. A General Agreement on Direct International
Investment may indeed seem fanciful to the readers of the
Journal today, but certainly no more so than the idea of a
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would have
seemed to the readers of the Journal five decades ago.
